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Abstract: Prototype theory is a semantic theory according to which the 
membership of conceptual categories is based not on a list of criterial features, 
but rather on the similarity to the most representative member of the category. 
Consequently, conceptual categories may lack classical definitions and rigid 
boundaries. This article supports the claims, already made by other scholars 
working in the field, that prototype theory may greatly augment our 
understanding of legal (i.e. statutory, judicial) interpretation. Legal provisions 
are traditionally written as classical definitions, but they are rarely applied that 
 
1The article is a part of a research project "The meaning of statutory language in light 
of selected theories from cognitive linguistics", financed by National Science Centre, 
Poland (2018/31/D/HS5/03922). 
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way. Statutory concepts tend to be interpreted with a great deal of flexibility, 
using a wide array of extra-textual factors. This is especially true for the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has to deal with the 
challenges of the multilingual, supranational law of the European Union.  
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TEORIA PROTOTYPU W PRAKTYCE ORZECZNICZNEJ 
TRYBUNAŁU SPRAWIEDLIWOŚCI UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ – 
STUDIUM PRZYPADKU 
 
Streszczenie: Teoria prototypu jest teorią semantyczną, zgodnie z którą 
przynależność do kategorii pojęciowych nie opiera się na zestawie określonych 
cech, lecz na podobieństwie do najbardziej reprezentatywnego egzemplarza 
danej kategorii. W związku z tym kategorie pojęciowe mogą nie poddawać się 
klasycznemu definiowaniu, a ich granice bywają rozmyte. Artykuł ten wspiera 
twierdzenia innych autorów, że teoria prototypów może znacząco pogłębić 
nasze rozumienie interpretacji prawniczej. Przepisy prawne są tradycyjnie 
formułowane jak klasyczne definicje, jednak rzadko są stosowane w ten 
sposób. Pojęcia ustawowe są często interpretowane z dużą elastycznością, przy 
wykorzystaniu szerokiej palety czynników pozatekstowych. Jest 
to szczególnie aktualne w przypadku orzecznictwa Trybunału 
Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej, który stoi przed wyzwaniem stosowania 
wielojęzycznego, ponadnarodowego prawa Unii Europejskiej. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: interpretacja prawa; semantyka języka prawnego; teoria 
prototypu; językoznawstwo kognitywne; prawo Unii Europejskiej. 
1. Introduction 
Legal theory has always been interested in the achievements of 
philosophy of language, formal logic, linguistics and other language-
oriented disciplines. This is because language is the most common 
means of expressing legal rules: “[t]he law is a profession of words” 
(Mellinkoff 2004: vii). Perhaps a more scholarly proposition would be 
that “law is not a discipline of words, but of concepts” (Bajčić 2017: 7), 
because when it comes down to it, concepts – not words – are the 
“crystallisations of legal rules” (Mattila 2006: 137). Bearing that in 
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mind, in this article I advocate the relevance of a semantic theory named 
prototype theory as a way of understanding the practice of legal (i.e. 
statutory, judicial, juristic) interpretation. This is not a genuinely novel 
idea. Similar claims have been made by others in the fields of legal 
theory and legal linguistics (see, for example, Winter 2001; Solan 2010; 
Bajčić 2017). I offer some additional support for such claims in the form 
of a detailed analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. I also argue that prototype theory obtains particular 
significance in the context of the legal system of the European Union, 
due to its institutional, political and linguistic characteristics. 
2. Prototype theory – an overview 
Prototype theory is a theory of categorisation originating from the work 
of American psychologist, Eleanor Rosch. It is based on 
psycholinguistic experiments conducted in the 1970s. It goes directly 
against what is known as the classical approach to human 
categorisation. According to that approach, which can be traced back to 
Aristotle, conceptual categories are defined by sets of features that are 
both necessary and sufficient. An object is recognised as a member of 
a category if it exhibits all the relevant features. It follows that (1) all 
members of a category are equal, (2) membership of a category is an 
all-or-nothing affair, and therefore (3) categories have rigid boundaries. 
Classical theory prevailed for centuries in numerous disciplines, 
including philosophy, psychology, anthropology, linguistics and – most 
notably for our purposes – law. As Lawrence Solan puts it: “[s]tatutes 
are generally written as classical definitions, which in turn are familiar 
to us as rules that tell us the conditions that are necessary and sufficient 
for us to use a word appropriately” (Solan 2010: 18).  
Rosch’s research proved that the actual psychological 
mechanisms of categorisation do not comply with the classical 
approach, at least with reference to certain types of conceptual 
categories, including: colours and shapes, natural-kind names (i.e. bird, 
fruit), artefacts names (i.e. furniture, vehicle, weapon). Instead of being 
defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features, these categories 
were found to be organised around the best, or the most representative 
example – called the prototype. The membership of a category is 
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established on the basis of similarity to the prototype. It results in an 
internal structure: “categories are composed of a ‘core meaning’ which 
consists of the ‘clearest cases’ (best examples) of the category, 
‘surrounded’ by other category members of decreasing similarity to that 
core meaning” (Rosch 1973: 112). Extensive research by Rosch and 
others has proved that prototypes have psychological reality, i.e. they 
are involved in category processing, including association, speed of 
reaction, recognition, probability judgments, drawing inferences, 
learning, and memorising (Rosch 1973, 1978, 2011).  
It should be stressed at this point that, contrary to a popular 
misreading, the notion of prototype should not be understood as 
referring to any particular entity, especially to a specific member of a 
category. Rather, it may refer to an abstract, idealised member of a 
category, a cluster of attributes providing the highest cue validity, or 
statistical functions over attributes: “To speak of a prototype at all is 
simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are 
judgments of degree of prototypicality” (Rosch 1975: 200). Rosch 
herself claims that there are no less than fourteen different types of 
prototypes that are appropriate for different types of conceptual 
categories (Rosch 2011: 101–103).  
Although prototype theory originated in the field of 
experimental psychology, it has been quickly taken up by linguists from 
the emerging movement labelled cognitive linguistics, most notably by: 
George Lakoff, Charles Fillmore and Ronald Langacker. It offered an 
alternative for “checklist theories of meaning” (Fillmore 1975), i.e. 
formal semantics based on componential analysis, employed in the 
transformative-generative grammar. Today, prototype theory is 
considered one of the cornerstones of cognitive linguistics, and has been 
utilised in various domains of linguistic research, including lexical 
semantics, syntactic theory, morphology, and phonology. (see: Lakoff 
1987; Langacker 2008; Taylor 2003). For convenience, it is often 
referred to as prototype theory. As a matter of fact, however, it is not a 
single theory, but rather a cluster of theories that share certain general 
characteristics (sometimes referred to as prototypical effects). 
According to Dirk Geerearts, these common characteristics boil down 
to the following four features (Geerearts 2016: 6–8): 
(1) Prototypical categories cannot be defined by means of a single 
set of necessary and sufficient features. Take a classic example 
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of a category FRUIT.2 Normally we expect fruits to be sweet, to 
have a certain size and shape, and to be eaten as a dessert.3 
However, there are obviously fruits that are not sweet 
(i.e. grapefruit, avocado), that are extraordinarily large 
(i.e. watermelon, coconut), and that are used for other culinary 
purposes (i.e. cranberry, avocado, lime). This lack of common 
features makes it impossible to formulate a rigid, classical 
definition of the concept of fruit, as such definitions are based on 
single sets of sufficient and necessary features. 
(2) The structure of prototypical categories takes the form of a radial 
set of clustered and overlapping senses. This characteristic is 
attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein and is called family 
resemblance. It means that, instead of a set of common features, 
we can observe “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail” (Wittgenstein 1953: 32). Apples 
and pears have a similar shape and size, which they share with 
peaches and apricots. The latter two, however, have also a large 
stone in them that makes them similar to plums, mangos and 
avocados. All these fruits grow on trees, just like cherries. 
Cherries, however, are much smaller in size, which makes them 
similar to grapes, blueberries, gooseberries and raspberries, etc.  
(3) Prototypical categories exhibit degrees of category membership. 
This feature is also known as typicality or goodness-of-example. 
It means that not every member of a category is equally 
representative – some members are better examples than others, 
because they exhibit more relevant features of the category. This 
is how the core-periphery distinction is formed. Apples, pears, 
peaches and oranges are prototypical examples of fruits and they 
constitute the “core” of the category. Watermelons, tomatoes and 
avocados are less prototypical, because they lack some of the 
typical features of fruits (i.e. watermelons have an enormous size 
and grow on the ground, tomatoes and avocados are not sweet 
and are not served as a dessert, etc.). They constitute the 
“periphery” of the category. The phenomenon of typicality is 
 
2 Note that the ordinary or folk meaning of fruit is concerned here, not a botanical 
definition. 
3 These expectations are obviously culture-dependant (as opposed to universal), which 
is explicitly admitted in the prototype theory. 
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encoded in natural languages in the form of so-called hedge 
words (typical, technically, virtually, strictly speaking, sort of, 
par excellence, etc.) It explains why we can say “Tomatoes are 
technically a fruit”, while the sentence “Apples are technically a 
fruit” sounds peculiar (Lakoff 1973). 
(4) Prototypical categories are blurred at the edges, which means that 
they do not have rigid boundaries. This links with the previous 
characteristics in that the degree of membership of a category 
may diminish to the point where it is no longer clear whether an 
object is still a member of the category. For instance: tomatoes, 
pumpkins, coconuts, olives and avocados are borderline fruits 
(Rosch 1975: 229-230). The non-rigidity of lexical categories 
poses serious problems for formal semantics, but not so much for 
everyday, practical purposes. From this perspective it should be 
rather considered a virtue (Wittgenstein 1953: 33). 
There is also one very important meta-theoretical commitment 
shared by prototype theorists and cognitive linguists in general. It is the 
assumption that linguistic knowledge cannot be precisely separated 
from a background of general knowledge about the world. In other 
words, there is no strict border between linguistic meaning and other 
areas of conceptual information, and consequently between semantics 
and pragmatics. This idea has been developed by numerous scholars 
and under various theoretical propositions, including the concepts of a 
semantic frame (Fillmore 1975) and the Idealized Cognitive Model 
(ICM) (Lakoff 1987). For the purposes of this article, however, the 
notion of encyclopaedic semantics will be used (Langacker 2008: 46-
47). 
3. The interpretation of EU law 
The prototype theory is relevant for legal practice, and consequently for 
legal theory, because the process of applying the law can be viewed as 
an act of categorisation. The core of judicial activity consists in 
classifying particular factual situations into relevant legal categories. 
As aptly put by the famous legal philosopher Herbert L.A. Hart:  
“[T]he law must (...), refer to classes of person, and to classes of acts, 
things, and circumstances; and its successful operation over vast areas 
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of social life depends on a widely diffused capacity to recognize 
particular acts, things, and circumstances as instances of the general 
classifications which the law makes” (Hart 1994: 124).  
Although categorisation is a complex cognitive operation, in the 
absence of doubts the human mind is capable of performing it 
unconsciously. In legal theory, such instances are often called easy 
cases. However, whenever doubts arise, legal categorisation becomes a 
deliberate process known to lawyers as legal interpretation or legal 
construction. Lawrence Solan describes it in the following way: “Most 
disputes over the meanings of statutes are about the fit between events 
in the world and the words in the statute” (Solan 2010: 50). These are 
known as hard cases and are the bread and butter of the judiciary in 
every legal system. The legal system of the European Union 
(hereinafter: the EU) is no exception.  
The EU courts, most notably the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter: CJEU), are given the task of applying – 
and consequently – interpreting EU law, including both primary law in 
the form of European treatises, as well as secondary law consisting of 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. As 
documented by the CJEU case law, the interpretation of EU law does 
not essentially differ from the interpretation of national law and utilises 
traditional methods of interpretation, namely linguistic (or textual), 
systemic (or contextual) and teleological (or purposive) (Lenaerts and 
Gutiérrez-Fons 2013: 4; Pacho Aljanti 2018: 33). However, two 
characteristic features of EU law are frequently discerned in the 
literature: conceptual autonomy and multilingualism (Bajčić 2017: 79-
106). Conceptual autonomy leads to the semantic independence of EU 
law. The legal concepts encapsulated in EU legislation are not the same 
as national legal concepts, even if denoted by the same terms (Bajčić 
2017: 80). The multilingualism of EU law is a major topic in legal 
linguistics (see, for example, Šarčević 2013; Bajčić 2017). Put very 
simply, it means that every piece of European legislation has 24 
language versions, with each version being equally authentic, “meaning 
that 24 different terms must refer to the same European concept” 
(Bajčić 2017: 165). Such a policy creates numerous practical problems. 
One of them is the existence of inevitable discrepancies between 
different language versions. In the CJEU's interpretive practice, this has 
resulted in a diminished role of textual methods and a reliance on 
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extralinguistic methods, including the teleological (i.e. purposive) 
approach, which the Court is famous for (Fenelly 1996: 664).  
These two features of EU law, namely conceptual autonomy 
and multilingualism, offer a unique theoretical perspective. As rightly 
noted in the literature: [W]ithin a multilingual legal environment such 
as the EU, the (...) problems of understanding the law are multiplied” 
(Bajčić 2017: 137). If we view, as Solan and many other theorists do, 
the application of law as an art of matching a legal provision with 
reality, then the application of EU law may be perceived as an art of 
matching two dozen legal provisions with more than two dozen 
different realities. As a result, CJEU case law provides fertile soil for 
semantic analyses. 
4. The concept of judicial authority 
The case study in this article is based on a series of CJEU judgments 
concerning the European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter: EAW). The 
EAW is an instrument of judicial co-operation in the area of criminal 
justice. It was introduced by the Council Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (2002/584/JHA). It is considered to be the main 
EU legislative reaction to the events of 9/11 (Klimek 2015: 365). 
Amongst the Member States, the Framework Decision has replaced the 
traditional multilateral system of extradition based on political 
decisions with a system based on the principle of the mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions. On the one hand, the system is relatively simple, 
fast and effective. It has been praised as being possibly “the most 
successful mutual recognition instrument ever” (Klimek 2015: 1). On 
the other hand, it has the potential to violate important legal values, 
including the accused or the convicted person’s fundamental rights (van 
der Mei 2017: 883). It does not come as a surprise, then, that CJEU case 
law concerning various aspects of the EAW system is very rich and not 
without controversy. For the purposes of this article, only one of these 
aspects will be discussed, namely the concept of judicial authority. 
According to the legal definition provided in the Framework 
Decision:  
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The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member 
State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State 
of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.4  
The body responsible for issuing (as well as executing) an EAW is 
denoted as judicial authority:  
The issuing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the 
issuing Member State which is competent to issue a European arrest 
warrant by virtue of the law of that State.5  
Judicial authority is a pivotal term, given the high stakes involved in 
issuing an EAW. However, it is not defined in the act. Prima facie, the 
term should not pose interpretive problems. English legal dictionaries 
define the adjective judicial quite clearly as “referring to a judge, court 
or the court system”6 or “relating to the courts or belonging to the office 
of a judge.”7 Therefore, it seems that judicial authority should be 
interpreted as covering only courts as institutions and individual 
judges.8 However, there are 22 other authentic language versions of the 
term.9 Many of them also refer directly to judges or courts (i.e. the 
Polish version: organ sądowy and the Slovakian version: súdny orgán). 
However, some versions may be construed more broadly, as covering 
also institutions other than courts or judges (i.e. the Swedish version: 
rättsliga myndigheten or the German version: Justizbehörde). These 
linguistic differences constitute the first layer of semantic 
discrepancies. It may be worth noting that the CJEU occasionally 
acknowledges such differences and conducts a comparative linguistic 
analysis as part of the interpretive process (Pacho Aljanti 2018; 
Paluszek 2019). However, this was not employed in cases concerning 
the term in question. It follows that it is not linguistic differences that 
pose the real interpretive problems. 
 
4 Article 1(1) (2002/584/JHA). 
5 Article 6(1) (2002/584/JHA). 
6 The People's Law Dictionary by Gerald and Kathleen Hill. URL: 
https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1062 
7 West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, 
Inc. URL: https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/judicial 
8 Note, however, that the term court has not been given a rigid definition by the Court 
(see: Bajčić 2017: 145). 
9 The Gaelic version is currently unavailable. For reference, see: table 1. 
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Table 1. The terms for judicial authority in different EU language versions: 
Language version Term used 
ENG Judicial authority 
BG съдебен орган 
ES autoridad judicial 
SC justiční orgán 
DA judicielle myndighed 
DE Justizbehörde 
ET õigusasutus 
EL δικαστική αρχή 
FR autorité judiciaire 
GA - 
HR Pravosudno tijelo 
IT autorità giudiziaria 
LV tiesu iestāde 
LT teisminė institucija 
HU igazságügyi hatóság 
MT L-awtorità ġudizzjarja 
NL rechterlijke autoriteit 
PL Organ sądowy 
PT autoridade judiciária 
RO Autoritatea judiciară 
SK súdny orgán 
SL pravosodni organ 
FI oikeusviranomainen 
SV rättsliga myndigheten 
 
The second and, judging from the role it plays in the CJEU's 
considerations, much more essential layer of semantic discrepancies is 
constituted by differences between the legal systems of the Member 
States. Although the general principles of the rule of law and the 
separation of powers are shared among all Member States, the specifics 
of the legal systems involved vary significantly. This includes the shape 
of criminal justice systems: their structure, hierarchy, internal 
institutional relations, external relations with other branches of 
government, number, types and character of institutions, procedural 
issues, etc. For instance, in some Member States, the pre-trial part of 
criminal proceedings is the domain of public prosecutors, while in 
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others it is run by examining magistrates or investigative judges. In 
some Member States, prosecutors’ offices are part of the judiciary, 
while in others they are subordinate to the executive. According to 
Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision, each Member State is entitled 
to assign the judicial authority responsible for issuing an EAW 
accordingly to its national law. Due to organisational, practical, 
political, historical or other reasons, many states have given the 
authority to issue an EAW to non-court bodies or offices, such as public 
prosecutors’ offices, police services or ministries of justice.10 Of course, 
these authorities also vary from state to state in their institutional 
position, internal organisation, procedural issues, etc. As a result, it is 
not always clear, especially for the prosecuted person, whether an 
institution assigned by a particular Member State should count as a 
judicial authority. Hence in the last couple of years,11 there have been 
numerous requests for preliminary rulings from CJEU whose real 
concern was the meaning and scope of the term judicial authority or, in 
other words, the contents of the concept of judicial authority. 
 
Table 2. Institutions and persons capable of issuing EAWs in legal systems of 
different Member States (based on Questionnaire on the CJEU’s judgments in 
relation to the independence of issuing judicial authorities and effective 
judicial protection by Eurojust & European Judicial Agency). 
 
Member 
State 
Issuing authority 
AT Prosecutor (but EAW becomes valid only if it is authorized by 
a judge) 
BE Investigative judge or prosecutor (following an arrest warrant 
issued by a court in the trial phase, or for the purpose of 
prosecution of minors, or for the purpose of the execution of 
sentences) 
BG Public prosecutor or court 
CY District court judge 
CZ Court 
 
10 See: table 2 for reference. Note, however, that some Member States have already 
adjusted their legislation to match recent CJEU case law and thus the contents of the 
table may diverge from the analyses presented in the article. 
11 The recent increase in the numbers of preliminary rulings on EAW-related issues has 
to do with a procedural change that entered into force in 2014. Since then, the Court's 
preliminary rulings on criminal matters are no longer subject to prior acceptance by the 
Member States (see: van der Mei 2017: 882-883). 
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DK Court 
DE Court 
EE Prosecutor's office 
EL Public Prosecutor of the Court of Appeals 
ES Investigative judge or court 
FI Public prosecutor 
FR Public prosecutor's office 
HR Public prosecutor 
HU Investigative judge or court 
IE The High Court 
IT Investigative judge or court or public prosecutor (for the 
purpose of the execution of sentences) 
LT Prosecutor General's Office or County Court 
LU Investigative judge or Prosecutor General (for the purpose of 
the execution of sentences) 
LV The Prosecutor General’s Office 
MT Court of Magistrates 
NL Investigative judge 
PL Circuit court 
PT Public prosecutor or judge  
RO Court 
SE Public prosecutor 
SI Investigative judge 
SK Court 
UK Judge 
NO Regional public prosecutor 
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5. The case study 
The first judgment in the series was case C-452/16 PPU (Poltorak).12 
The facts of the case are as follows: Mr Poltorak, a Polish national, was 
given a custodial sentence by a District Court in Sweden. The EAW 
with a view to executing that sentence in Sweden was issued by the 
Swedish police board, in accordance with the national law. The 
executing authority requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU 
regarding its doubts as to whether the police board can be counted as 
the issuing judicial authority for the purposes of executing a custodial 
sentence. The Court acknowledged that the term judicial authority is 
not defined in the act, and that it requires “an autonomous and uniform 
interpretation which (...) must take into account the terms of that 
provision, its context and the objective of the Framework.” Next, the 
Court stated that “the words ‘judicial authority’, contained in that 
provision, are not limited to designating only the judges or courts of a 
Member State, but may extend, more broadly, to the authorities required 
to participate in administering justice in the legal system concerned.” 
However, referring to the principle of the separation of powers, the 
Court drew a line between authorities administering justice (which can 
be considered as judicial) and the administrative or police authorities, 
which are within the province of the executive. Consequently, it ruled 
that the term judicial authority cannot be interpreted as covering the 
police services of a Member State. 
On the same day, a judgment was passed in the case 
C-477/16 PPU (Kovalkovas).13 The request for a preliminary ruling 
was made in connection with the execution of an EAW issued by the 
Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania with a view to 
executing a custodial sentence. The argumentation of the Court was 
nearly identical to the one provided in the previous ruling. It was based 
on the distinction between judicial and administrative authorities, with 
the Ministry of Justice obviously falling within the scope of the latter. 
These cases make the first series of CJEU judgments 
concerning the concept of judicial authority.14 On the one hand, the 
 
12 Judgment of 10 November 2016. 
13 Judgment of 10 November 2016. 
14 The third judgment of that day is C-453/16 PPU (Özçelik) which deals with a 
different – though largely interconnected – issue, namely the concept of judicial 
decisions. 
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rulings confirmed that the concept should be construed as denoting not 
only judges or courts, but also other authorities participating in 
administering justice. Note that this is contrary to some language 
versions of Article 6(1) of the Framework Decision, which seem to refer 
exclusively to courts. On the other hand, it drew a line between judicial 
and administrative authorities, defining police services and ministries 
of justice as the latter. These considerations, however, have mostly a 
negative or exclusionary aspect – they tell us which authorities do not 
count as judicial authorities, yet they do not provide us with any 
substantial definition of the term in question.  
The second series of judgments was passed in 2019 and 
comprises of three cases. In the joined cases C-508/18 and 
C-82/19 PPU,15 EAWs were issued by the offices of German public 
prosecutors for the purposes of criminal prosecution. Building on the 
previous case law, the Court initially recognised that public prosecutor's 
offices in Germany must be regarded as participating in the 
administration of criminal justice. As such they meet the institutional 
requirements put forward in C-452/16 PPU and C-477/16 PPU cases. 
Nevertheless, the Court questioned the independency of the issuing 
authorities from the executive. According to the information provided 
by the German government, public prosecutor's offices in Germany are 
part of a hierarchical structure that is connected with the minister for 
justice of a given Land. A minister for justice has the power to issue 
instructions to public prosecutors in specific cases. Although this power 
is exercised very rarely and in accordance with statutory law, and had 
not been exercised in the cases in question, the risk remains that a 
decision on issuing EAW may be influenced by the executive. For this 
reason, the CJEU ruled that the concept of judicial authority,  
must be interpreted as not including public prosecutors’ offices of a 
Member State which are exposed to the risk of being subject, directly 
or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the 
executive, such as a Minister for Justice, in connection with the 
adoption of a decision to issue a European arrest warrant. 
On the same day, a judgment was passed in case C-509/1816 
concerning an EAW issued by the Prosecutor General of Lithuania for 
the purposes of a criminal prosecution. The argumentation was almost 
 
15 Judgment of 27 May 2019. 
16 Judgment of 27 May 2019. 
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identical to the one discussed above, except for the conclusion. The 
Court recognised that the Lithuanian prosecutor general, although 
institutionally independent from the judiciary, is also independent from 
the executive in the context of issuing an EAW. Consequently, it meets 
not only the institutional requirements discerned in the previous case 
law,17 but also the requirement regarding independence from the 
executive, which was not met by the German public prosecutors’ 
offices.  
This second series of judgments provided a refinement of the 
concept of judicial authority. A new definitional element was added, 
namely the requirement of independence from the executive. As we 
have seen, not all prosecutors’ offices of the Member States meet this 
requirement. 
The third and the most recent series of judgments was passed at 
the end of 2019. In case C-489/19 PPU18 a request for a preliminary 
ruling was made in the context of the execution of an EAW issued by 
an Austrian public prosecutor's office for the purposes of conducting a 
criminal prosecution. The Court acknowledged that public prosecutors’ 
offices in Austria are directly subordinate to the higher public 
prosecutors’ offices and subject to their instructions, and that the latter 
are in turn subordinate to the Federal Minister of Justice. Therefore they 
do not meet the criterion of independence, just like their colleagues 
from Germany. However, an EAW issued by a prosecutor's office in 
Austria, in order for it to be transmitted, must be endorsed by a court, 
which checks the conditions necessary for the issue and the 
proportionality of the EAW. The endorsement decision is subject to 
appeal before courts. This complies with the demand, expressed in 
previous case law, namely that the decision to issue an EAW, when it 
is taken by an authority that participates in the administration of justice 
without being a court, must be capable of being the subject of judicial 
proceedings that meet the requirements of effective judicial protection. 
As a result, the Court ruled that the described procedure satisfies such 
 
17 It is worth noting that, according to the Lithuanian constitution and the case law of 
the Lithuanian constitutional court, the prosecutor general of Lithuania is not 
responsible for the administration of justice, and does not perform any functions related 
to the administration of justice during any pre-trial criminal investigation for which he 
is responsible. Apparently then, the Court decided to interpret the requirement of 
administering criminal justice autonomously, in a direct conflict with the national law. 
18 Judgment of 9 October 2019. 
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requirements and the Austrian authorities fall within the concept in 
question. 
In the joined cases C-566/19 and C-626/19,19 the Court 
addressed the status of public prosecutors in France (called 
magistrates). The Court first dealt with the requirement of 
independence, stating that it is not called into question by the fact that 
French prosecutors are placed under the direction and supervision of 
their superiors, and are therefore required to comply with their 
instructions, nor by the fact they may be issued general criminal policy 
instructions by the Minister for Justice. The Court then discussed the 
requirement of effective judicial protection. It acknowledged that 
effective judicial protection may be achieved by various means, and a 
separate right of appeal against a decision to issue an EAW, as 
identified in one of the previous judgments, is only one possibility. In 
the case of the French legal system, judicial protection and the 
proportionality of an EAW is safeguarded by the fact that national arrest 
warrants, which may subsequently form the basis of EAWs, are issued 
by investigative judges, i.e. judicial authorities par excellence, whose 
decisions are subject to judicial review. Analogical argumentation and 
conclusions were presented in case C-625/1920 pertaining to Swedish 
prosecutors’ offices. 
The last case in the series, C-627/19,21 addressed a question 
concerning an EAW issued by a Belgian prosecutor's office, not for the 
purpose of a criminal prosecution, but for the purpose of enforcing a 
custodial penalty imposed by a final sentence. Belgian law does not 
provide for an appeal against a decision on issuing an EAW. However, 
the Court ruled that whenever an EAW 
(...) is aimed at the enforcement of a penalty, judicial oversight is 
achieved by the enforceable judgment on which the arrest warrant is 
based. The enforcing judicial authority may presume that the decision 
to issue such an arrest warrant was taken in judicial proceedings in 
which the person sought was the beneficiary of guarantees as regards 
the protection of his fundamental rights. Furthermore, the 
proportionality of that arrest warrant also follows from the sentence 
imposed (...). 
 
19 Judgment of 12 December 2019. 
20 Judgment of 12 December 2019. 
21 Judgment of 12 December 2019. 
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As we see, the third series of judgments concerning the concept 
in question provided further requirements, as well as modifying the 
previous ones. Contrary to some earlier decisions, public prosecutors' 
offices in several Member States were classified as satisfying the 
requirements established by the Court, based not necessarily on their 
institutional position, but rather on different safeguard procedures that 
they provide.  
6. Semantic analysis 
It follows from the foregoing discussion that the concept of judicial 
authority is complex and problematic. The Court has not even attempted 
to determine its scope and meaning through a single, all-inclusive 
definition. Instead, it has identified various requirements that must be 
satisfied by a person or an institutional body in order to be considered 
a judicial authority. It should be apparent now, however, that these 
requirements do not form a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
as expected in the classical theory of categorisation. Rather, the Court's 
case law became an arena of an ongoing development and modification 
of these requirement. In one case the Court stated that public 
prosecutors’ offices may not be counted as judicial authorities if they 
are instructed by the executive, such as a minister for justice. In another 
case it concluded that such instructions from a minister for justice are 
acceptable if the decision can be reviewed by a court. In yet another 
case it stated that such a review is not necessary in the case of issuing 
an EAW for the purposes of executing a sentence (as opposed to 
conducting criminal proceedings). Further distinctions and restrictions 
are likely to come with future cases, as the discussion about the concept 
of judicial authority can hardly be considered settled. What we are 
witnessing is a process of constant refinement of the concept in 
question. 
In the analysed judgments, no less than seven requirements for 
a judicial authority may be distinguished (see: diagram 1):22 
 
22 Because of the theoretical, rather than practical, goals of the article, the list does not 
purport to be exhaustive. For instance, it does not take into account several important 
judgments concerning the sister concept of judicial decision that are undoubtedly 
relevant to the issue discussed here. 
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1. being a member of the judiciary; 
2. participating in administering justice; 
3. authorisation of the decision by a court or a judge; 
4. providing effective judicial protection of rights during criminal 
proceedings; 
5. possibility of subjecting the decision to judicial review; 
6. not being a member of the executive; 
7. not being exposed to the risk of being subject, directly or 
indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the 
executive. 
 
Diagram 1. The definitional aspect of the category JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: 
 
 
In terms of the theory of categorisation, these requirements can be 
perceived as features or attributes associated with the category 
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. The important thing to note is that a person 
or an institutional body does not need to exhibit all these features in 
order to be classified as a judicial authority. We have seen that, 
according to CJEU case law, not all judicial authorities are members of 
the judiciary (i.e. the prosecutor general in Lithuania), not all are 
independent from the executive (i.e. the public prosecutors’ offices in 
Austria), not all have their decisions subject to judicial review (i.e. 
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public prosecutors in France and Sweden), not all provide effective 
judicial protection of rights during criminal proceedings (i.e. public 
prosecutors in Belgium in the case of issuing an EAW for the purpose 
of executing a custodial sentence), etc. In other words, the category 
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY reveals a prototypical structure. It explains 
why the Court has not opted for a rigid, classical definition. Instead, its 
case law provides an intricate network of requirements that take into 
account the institutional peculiarities of different national legal orders. 
It should also be noted that the list of requirements is not necessarily 
complete – it is very likely that future cases will cause the Court to 
identify additional requirements, or to refine those previously 
discerned, as has already occurred. This phenomenon has been duly 
recognised in legal translation theory: “word meaning is a dynamic 
entity subject to change in connection with the argumentative battle 
concerning meaning” (Engberg 2002: 385). It concurs with the idea that 
meaning is constructed in application to particular facts, and not in 
advance of application, which is advocated not only in cognitive 
linguistics, but also in hermeneutic tradition (Walshaw 2013). 
The aforementioned discussion concerned the definitional or 
intensional dimension of the concept in question. In that aspect, the 
category JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, as construed by the CJEU, 
conforms to the tenets of prototype theory, namely to the lack of a rigid 
definition and to family resemblance as a principle governing its 
internal structure (Geerearts 1989: 7-8). Now let us turn to the 
referential or extensional dimension of the category JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY. 
As has already been mentioned, the types of institutional bodies 
or individuals notified by the Member States as judicial authorities are 
diverse (see: diagram 2).23 Those bodies that exhibit all the 
aforementioned features form the “core” of the category. They are the 
prototypical examples of judicial authorities, most notably various 
types of national courts (the white boxes on the diagram 2). Then, there 
are those that exhibit only a minimal number of relevant features, and 
thus cannot be classified as judicial authorities. For instance, Swedish 
police services do participate in conducting criminal proceedings and 
enjoy much institutional independency, but they lack other features, 
such as being a part of the judiciary, or providing an effective protection 
 
23 It should be noted, however, that this diversity has recently been diminishing due to 
the impact of CJEU case law. 
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of rights (the grey boxes on the diagram 2). Finally, there are those that 
exhibit some of the features of the category. They are non-prototypical 
examples of judicial authorities and they form the “periphery”. This is 
the case of public prosecutors’ offices and prosecutors general (the 
white-grey boxes on the diagram 2). It should also be noted that the 
borderline of the category is blurred. Consequently, public prosecutors’ 
offices and prosecutors general in some member states fall within the 
scope of the concept in question, while in others they do not. It depends 
on the number and the relative weight of the features they exhibit. As 
the recent CJEU case law illustrates, there are no hard and fast rules 
governing the process of their classification. The number of relevant 
features is potentially infinite, because there are infinite possibilities of 
how a national system of criminal justice can be constructed. Because 
of that, the fuzzy borderline of the concept in question should be 
considered rather a virtue than a drawback, just as Wittgenstein claimed 
(Wittgenstein 1953: 33).  
Again, we can see that the treatment of the category JUDICIAL 
AUTHORITY by the CJEU conforms to fundamental characteristics of 
prototype theory. Firstly, there are certainly better (i.e. courts) and 
worse (i.e. prosecutors’ offices) examples of the category. Secondly, 
the category has proved to be flexible and lacking rigid borders. This 
observation may seem to be conflicting with the nature of adjudication, 
as the Court has to decide every case in an all-or-nothing manner. In 
other words, each particular institution or person must be declared 
either as falling within the scope of the concept of judicial authority or 
not, tertium non datur. However, we have seen that, even within a given 
subcategory (i.e. a public prosecutor's office) the classifications made 
by the CJEU are neither homogeneous nor fully predictable.24  
 
 
24 This thesis is additionally supported by the discrepancies between Court judgments 
and the opinions of Advocates General on the subject matter. For the sake of brevity, 
however, this thread had to be omitted. 
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Diagram 2. The referential aspect of the category JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. 
The colours of the boxes symbolise different levels of category membership. 
The lines between the boxes symbolise relative similarity (solid line – strong 
similarity, dotted line – weak similarity): 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
The common view about language and meaning shared by generations 
of lawyers and jurists is based on the classical theory of categorisation. 
This includes reliance on classical definitions, deductive reasoning and 
other tools of formal logic (Winter 2001: 6-12). However, in practice, 
legal rules do not always work as expected by this approach. As O.W. 
Holmes famously wrote: “The life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience” (Holmes 1882: 1). One of the reasons for this is that 
reality does not have a rigid, logical structure. As put by H. Hart:  
“If the world in which we live were characterised only by a finite 
number of features, and these together with all the modes in which they 
could combine were known to us, the provision could be made in 
advance for every possibility” (Hart 1961: 128).  
But it cannot. Reality is much too complicated, manifold and 
unpredictable to be fully covered by any system of language or logic. 
Consequently, it is the prototype theory of categorisation that provides 
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a more suitable description of the practice of interpreting and applying 
the law. As such, it offers a useful tool for legal theory. 
The above statement has a universal appeal, as proved by 
numerous previous legal analyses employing the prototype theory to 
various theoretical as well as practical issues (see for example:Winter 
2001; Hamilton 2002; Paul 2002; Solan 2010; Osenga 2011; Smith 
2011). However, there are reasons to claim that the prototype theory 
may be particularly useful in the context of EU law. It turns out that the 
characteristics of EU law, namely multilingualism and conceptual 
autonomy, provide a very convenient opportunity to examine the 
mechanisms of human categorisation. These two features taken 
together serve to underline the difference between words and concepts 
or, accordingly, between the linguistic and conceptual levels of law. 
Whereas in a unilingual environment it is rather unnatural to detach a 
concept from the term naming it, in a multilingual environment – such 
as EU – it becomes not only a theoretical, but also a practical necessity. 
As a result, conceptual phenomena become more visible and 
susceptible to analysis. 
This article has been deliberately restricted to the concept of 
judicial authority. However, further to my research of CJEU case law, 
many similar analyses could be provided to support this claim. For 
practical reasons, two types of concepts that seem to be particularly apt 
for this form of examination may be discerned. The first type is 
concepts denoted by highly technical, legal terms, such as judicial 
authority, detention,25 or probation measure.26 Their meaning is 
constructed against the background of national legal systems, which 
may vary significantly. As a result, they have to be construed to be 
flexible enough to embrace various institutional realities and to secure 
the purposes of the legal instruments they designate. The second type is 
concepts denoted by common language names for the purposes of tax 
classifications, such as beer,27 dry pasta,28 packing containers,29 
electrical machine with translation or dictionary functions,30 
 
25 See: judgments of 28 July 2016 C-294/16 PPU and of 14 May 2020 C-924/19 PPU 
and C-925/19 PPU. 
26 See: judgment of 26 March 2020 in Case C-2/19. 
27 See: judgment of 13 March 2019 in Case C-195/18. 
28 See: judgment of 6 September 2018 in Case C-471/17. 
29 See: judgment of 20 November 2014 in Case C-40/14. 
30 See: judgment of 11 June 2015 in Case C-58/14. 
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thermometer,31 etc. There are obvious prototypical examples of such 
categories, and it is easy enough to formulate their approximate 
definitions. However, human technological and economical invention 
keeps throwing up novel, unpredictable examples that constantly 
challenge such definitions and reveal new layers of doubts.32 The Court 
appears to be fully aware of that. In such cases, it tends to refrain from 
formulating classical definitions of the concept in question, and instead 
rely on identifying requirements that are flexible and adjustable. 
As has already been mentioned, the CJEU is often associated 
with a teleological (i.e. purposive) approach to legal interpretation, as 
opposed to a linguistic (i.e. textual) approach. The case study 
concerning the term judicial authority would be a good example of this 
approach. The requirements and exceptions identified by the Court for 
judicial authorities can hardly be derived from the dictionary meaning 
of the term. They are clearly effects of extralinguistic, teleological 
considerations. Note, however, that this is perfectly in line with 
cognitive linguistics and its denial of a separate level of purely linguistic 
meaning. If we adopt the encyclopaedic concept of meaning then we 
will no longer see the Court's approach as a rejection of linguistic 
methods of interpretation. Rather, we will expect the meaning of legal 
terms to be modified by a “dynamic matrix” of extralinguistic 
knowledge (Bajčić 2017: 166) and we will understand that it is shaped 
by the normative context of European and national legal orders 
(Šarčević 2000: 5). Although this is mainly a matter of perspective, I 
believe that prototype theory gives a more credible, more cohesive and 
more comprehensive account of the application of law, especially 
though not exclusively, by the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
One final remark has to be made with a view to the practical 
consequences of the approach advocated in this article. After all, 
prototype theory is a linguistic – not a legal – theory. It reveals the 
mechanisms of conceptual categorisation. It may, as a result, lead jurists 
to adopt a different view about categorical borders (see: Bajčić 2017: 
166). However, as mentioned earlier, it offers no excuse for a judge 
whose job is precisely to decide “whether a particular event in the world 
fits a legally relevant category” (Solan 2018: 338). Therefore, it should 
 
31 See: judgment 26 November 2015 in Case C-44/15. 
32 For instance: are noodles that were pre-cooked, fried and then packed in a dry state 
to be classified as dry pasta? Are paper, one-use indicators of a certain threshold 
temperature to be classified as thermometers?  
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not be treated as a theory of how judges (or jurists, or lawyers) are 
supposed to interpret the law. Nor should it be used as a direct 
justification of any particular interpretive choice. Lawrence Solan, who 
is an undisputed champion of contemporary legal-linguistics, has noted: 
“[m)any of the problems concerning the construal of legal language are 
linguistic in nature. However, the solutions to these difficulties are not 
linguistic unless the legal system makes them so” (Solan 2018: 338). 
As rightly acknowledged by another scholar, “standards for the 
determination of legal meaning are necessarily internal to legal 
practice” (Fallon 2015: 1243). In other words, linguistic theories have 
the potential to enlighten those engaged in legal practice and help them 
properly understand the fabric of the language they happen to be 
working with. As a result, they may support certain approaches to legal 
interpretation and undermine others that are based on incorrect 
assumptions about language. At the same time, however, they cannot 
replace the legal considerations, legal values and legal arguments 
necessary to resolve interpretive questions in applying law.  
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